q'his paper provides an account of the role that the interaction between nominal and temporal reference plays in resolving temporal reference. Exploiting this interaction in resolving temporal reference clarifies how the process of resolving nominal reference interacts with the process of resolving temporal reference, and how a restricted set of worht knowledge contributes to resolving temporal reference.
INTRODUCTION
B.esolving reference or anaphora is of great interest in computational linguistics and formM semantics. Research on reference began with the development of models to account for nominal reference bronght about by the usage of nominal expressions such as definite noun phrases and pronominals (Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein 1983; Kameyama 1986) . Recently a number of researchers have indicated that temporal expressions such as tense morphemes and temporal adverbials can be regarded as referring expressions and have proposed models for temporal reference resolution (Hinrichs 1986; Hwang and Schubert 1992; Kameyama, Passonnean and Poesio 1993; Lascarides 1.992; Partee 1984; Song and Cohen 1991; Webber 1988) .
Sentences in a dialogue describe eventualities 1 and introduce them into the context. The time of an eventuality described by a sentence is interpreted as temporally related to the times of other eventualities that were introduced into the context earlier in the dialogue. Temporal expressions are regarded as referring expressions since they convey information about the time of an eventuality, which is interpreted relative to the times of other eventualities in the context. Resolving temporal reference means determining what temporal relationships exist between an eventuality described by a sentence of a dialogue and eventualities that have been introduced into the context earlier in the dialogue. 2 Resolving temporal reference is requisite to many tasks, such as designing a natural language interface to a planning system in which temporal information is crucial (Crouch and Pullman tan event.uality is the general term for an event, process or state, due to Bach (1986) .
~The chief concern here is temporal reference to intersentential context. Thus this paper does not address the probiem of determining what temporal relationships an eventuality described by a clause of a sent, ence has with eventualities described by other clauses of the same sentence. This problem is covered by Brent (1990) , Itwang et al. (1992), and Reichenbaeh (1947) .
1993).
To understand the notion of temporal reference, consider the following dialogue, (dl I'm sure that l forwarded it to you. (s5) John: Sochira no mail box ni at-ta-desho? you GFN mail boz" in be-PAST.
II was in your mail bo~', wasn't it?.
Sentence (s2) describes an eventnality of deleting, Ed, and sentence (s4) describes an eventuality of forwarding, F/. Both eventualities are past ones, since the matrix verbs, "tensousnru (forward)" and "kesu (delete)", 4 describe momentary acts and are accompanied with the past-tense morpheme "ta". Although the tense morphemes of sentences convey information about the times of eventualities described by the sentences, the context also imposes restrictions on the times of the eventualities. In dialogue (dl), the time of tQ described by (s4) is interpreted as relative to the time of ]'d~ in the context: i.e. the time of E/ is before the time of 1,2d. in this sense, the time of 1~ is referred to in uttering sentence (s4).
Existing models of temporal reference account for the parMlel between temporal and nominal reference. Itowever, as I will state in see. 2, existing models fail to explain the interaction between temporal reference and nominal reference (reference interaction for short), i{eference interaction is a phenomenon in which tile process of resolving nominal reference inahl extfibiting a .Japanese dialogue, English words such as "Mary" mtd "mail" are used only for easy comprehensibility, hi addlt, ion, sentence-final forms such as "yone", "kedo", "yo", and "desho" indicate mental states of file speaker that are/mrelated to the subject of this paper.
4 "tensoushi-" and "keshi-" in file dialogue are inflections of the verbs "tensousm 'u" and "kesu" respectively. teracts with the process of resolving temporal reference, when an utterance involves temporal and nominal reference at the same time. l)ue to as1 insutticient account of the reference interaction, existing models cannot show how the process of resolving nominal reference Mfects the process of resolving temporal reference.
The chief concern of this paper is to describe the role that the reference interaction plays in resolving telnporal reference and demonstrate that the reference interaction serves to clarity how a restricted set of world knowledge contributes to the resolution process. I focus on sentences with past-tense morphemes in Japanese dialogues. Previous work also used pasttense sentences as a touchstone to show the validity of a model (IIinrichs 1986; Kameyama ct al. 1993; Lascarides 1992; Partee 1984; Webber 1988) . As I will state in sec. 2.2, the retk'xence interaction is not a domestic plleuolnenon in Japanese dialogues.
In sec. 2, I argue that existing models do not de-. count for the reference interaction, that the reference interaction plays an important role in an account of how temporal reference is resolved, and that exploiting the reference interaction clarifies how a rest, rioted set of world knowledge serves to resolve tempered reference. In sec. 3, a tYamework is presented, within which the reference interaction is exploited in resolving temporal reference. In sec. 4, 1 demonstrate how f, he framework works. In sec. 5, [ smnmarize the claims of this paper and describe fnture, work.
PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING MODELS 2.1 Approaches in existing models
In existing models, when the t, ime, 7', of an eventalality described by a sentence of a dialogue is given, the problem of resolving temporal reference is divided into (i) that of identifying the time, 71/, of an eventuality that has been introduced into the context, and (ii) that of determining what temporal relationship hohls between 7' and 7):. These rules are t;ermed default interpretation rules since they are utilized when world knowledge of causality is not available.
[n approach (ii-b), the temporal relationship between l,] and .l¢tf is determined according to world knowledge of the causal relationships between eventualities. Lascarides (1.9!t2) presented a model based on a theory of defeasihle inference for integrating world knowledge of causality with the process of determining the temporal and causal relationships between even tualities mentioned in a discourse. This approach was also adopted in a model proposed by Kameyama ct el. (1993) . In these models, approaches (ii-~) and (ii-b) are unified within a single framework. Let me call the interpretation based on approach (ii-a) the (lefanlt interpretation, and the interpretation based on approach (ii-b) the knowledge-based interpretation. The knowledge~based interpretation is preferred over the default interpretation when they disagree.
l,et me explain how existing models work by using (tialogue (dl) ~ as, example. 1 focus on how (s4) i,, interpreted, assuming that the time of /~'a is in the. temporal focus, l)eNnlt interpretation rule (hi.l) says that the Lime of ]Q must be after the time of lea sittce both eventualities are not>stative, past eventualities. Ilowevcr, the relevant interpretation is that F,/ temporally precedes l','a. Thus, the default interpretation does not coincide with the relevant interpretation. In this case, existing models resort to world knowledge of the ransal relationships between £'a and Ej. ltow. cw'.r, existing models do not clarify what kind of world knowledge is use.d (Kameyama et el. 1993; I,ascarides 1992) . In this sense, the world knowledge used in existing models is unrestricted. 1 agree with such an approach its that various causal relationships are in--volved ill the process of resolving reference. IIoweveL it is desirable to find a restricted set of world knowledge and avoid resorting directly to the entire set of ~Note that the time of a stative even~uallty is usually nc)t regarded as being in the t.emporal focus.
world knowledge of causality since such knowledge is enormous.
Consequently, existing models exploit the notion of temporal focus or temporal center, which serves only to show that temporal reference is accounted for in the same way as nominal reference. However, existing models do not explain how the process of resolving nominal reference affects the process of resolving temporal reference and assume that the entire set of knowledge of causality can be used.
Reference interaction
In this section, I argue that the notion of reference interaction provides an account of the temporal reference in (s4), which existing approaches ignore. Moreover, a restricted set of world knowledge can be used to explain the reference interaction.
Sentence (sl) introduces an individual 6, M, which is an e-mail message. Sentence (s4) involves nominal reference to M: tile object of "tensousnrn (forward)" is zero-pronominalized and refers to M. Moreover, sentence (s4) involves the interaction between nominal and temporal reference. That is to say, what the object being forwarded is affects what the time of forwarding is. I will explain this below.
When someone forwards something to someone else, the time of forwarding must be during the time when the object being forwarded exists. In other words, the time of forwarding depends on what the object being forwarded is. Moreover, when someone deletes something, the time when the object being deleted exists must be before the time of deleting. This kind of world knowledge can be regarded as knowledge of temporal relationships between eventualities and the existential status of individuals. Judging fi:om such knowledge, the eventuality of forwarding, EI, cannot temporally follows the eventuality of deleting, Ea. This is because both the object of "kesu (delete)" and the object of "tensousuru (forward)"refer to M, so the time of t~'f must be during the time when M exists and the time when M exists rnust be before the time of Ed, The interpretation consistent with such knowledge is that /~Sf temporally precedes Ea. Consequently, identifying the referent of the zero-pronominalized object of/Q serves to resolve temporal reference, and the knowledge of temporal relationships between eventualities and the existential status of individuals can be used to explain the reference interaction. 7
Moreover, knowledge of the temporal relationships between eventualities and the existential status of individnals can be regarded as a restricted set of world knowledge of causality. It is restricted because given an eventuality, E, we have only to allow for the individuals that constitute E and do not have to allow °flere, "individual" is used as a term for a single person or thing.
7In this paper, only nominal reference to individuals is allowed for.
for all eventualities that can be causally related to E. Exploiting the reference interaction clarifies how such a restricted set of world knowledge contributes to resolving temporal reference. When such restricted world knowledge is sufficient to resolve temporal reference, immediate recourse to the entire set of world knowledge of causality call be avoided. Note that such knowledge is not selected arbitrarily. It is the knowledge that is necessary for explaining the reference interaction.
Next I review two existing proposals that are related to the argument above. First, Hwang el al. (1992) argued that resolving temporal reference requires plausible inference that can interact with various processes such as resolution of anaphora, introduction of new individuals and identification of spatial and temporal frames. They also argue that the plausible inference has to rely on world knowledge such as that one normally would not buy broken things (IIwang e¢ al. 1992: p.239) . Their argument agrees with the approach presented here. They did not, however, present a concrete model to support the argument.
Second, Webber and Baldwin (1992) discussed the integration of two independent mechanisms for context-change by entity introduction and by event simulation. The idea of integrating these contextchange mechanisms and that of exploiting the reference interaction in resolving reference share the view that the relationships between eventualities and the existential status of entities or individuals serve in interpreting referring expressions. They, however, focused on interpreting nominal reference made by the use of definite nouns, rather than on the problem of resolving temporal reference by exploiting the reference interaction, which is the chief concern of this paper.
Finally, it is easy to see that the reference interaction also occurs in an English dialogue. In an English counterpart of (dl), the pronoun "it" is used the same way as a Japanese zero pronoun is used. l,ikewise, the restricted knowledge stated above is common to Japanese and English.
A FRAMEWORK
A framework is presented, within which the reference interaction is exploited in resolving temporal reference. First, in sec. 3.1, the descriptive device is shown. Next, in sec. 3.2, the process of resolving temporal reference is described.
A descriptive device
In a diMogue, sentences convey information about tim speakers' mental attitudes toward eventualities. This framework does not concern the mental attitudes, but focuses on the eventualities described in the sentences. An eventuality is written as a variant of the Davidsonian representation (l)avidson 1980; Vlach 1993). For example, the informational content of the eventuality of forwarding described by (s4) is written as follows. Llcarcr(l') means that P is the hearer. In the above, the recipient of forwarding is identified with the hearer since it is specified by tire pronoun "sochira", designating the hearer. In addition, ewmtuality *c:1 is non-st~d.ive.
SpecchTimc(T)
means that time 7' is the speech time, Tcmp]Coeus(7 ') means that time T is in the temporal focus, and 7'Rel(l{, 7't,7:e) means that temporal relationship lg holds between time ~I'] and 7). In this framework, temporal relationships are represented based on temporal logic proposed by Allen (1983) and times are treated as temporal intervals. In the above, time *tSl is before sl)eech time *GpJ since *Ill is specified by the past-tense morpheme "ta". (['led d(~t' ,[,[~el(Mect, *td, j, *td) . l lgd says that the object being deleted, *oh j, exists at time *ld and at h)cation *loci owned by the agent of deleting, *agent. 7'lQ says that the time when ,obj exists must be immediately before the time of deleting.
3.2

Resolving temporal reference
This framework assumes that a representation of an eventuality described by a sentence is given, in the representation, pronominalized individuals an(l indeterminate teml)oral relationships are represented as variables such as *agent1 ~md *rOll in (rl). When the representation of the eventuality described by the current sentence is given, representations of the existential status of individuals and temporal relationships between the eventuality amt the existential status of individuals are derived by using knowledge such gm (r2) and (r3). These representations are interpreted within the context as described below. In the interpretation process, appropriate constants are substituted for variables. After the interpretation process, the representations are introduced into the context. Thus, the context includes representations of eventnalities, the existential status of individuals, and temporal relationships among the eventualities and the existential status of individuals that have been mentioned in a dialogue. In addition, it includes representations that show who is the speaker~ who is the hearer, what is the speech time, and what is the time in the temporal focus.
Let RSet be a set of representations of an eventuality, E, described by a sentence, the existential status of individuals mentioned in E, and temporal relationships between them. The interpretation process is as follows. In (I2), temporal reference is resolved. The interpretation by transitive and reflexive laws governing temporal relationships is preferred over the interpretation by default interpretation rules.
This framework uses the defanlt interpretation rules (R1) and (R2), which are used in existing models. The default interpretation rules (R1) and (R2) are represented as the following theorems, (r4) and (r5) respectively, s In the above, R1 D R2 means that RI implies R> The transitive and reflexive laws governing temporal relationships are also represented as theorems. For brevity's sake, I will not present all the laws. Allen (1983) presents a exhanstive list of transitive SHare i ignore conditions where the eventualities at stake are past ones. laws governing temporal relationships. The following theorems are sufficient for dealing with dialogue (dl). 
~, w, *~).
The interpretation by the transitive and rellexive laws governing temporal relationships can be regarded as a kind of of knowledge-based interpretation as described in sec. 2.1, although only a restricted set of world knowledge is used in this framework. As demonstrated in see. 4, the interaction between references to individuals and times plays an important role in resolving temporal reference according to the transitive and reflexive laws governing temporal ,:elationships.
EXAMPLES
This section demonstrates how the framework works by using sentence (s4) and (s5) as examples. First, consider the interpretation of (s4) under the context established by (s2). Sentence (s2) introduces an eventuality of deleting, Ed, into the context. The eventuality is represented as follows.
in (rg), M represents an individual, which is an e-mail message, Td represents the time of Ed, and ?['~p represents the time when sentence (s2) is uttered. 9
By using knowledge (r3), the existential status, Era, of M and the temporal relationship between Ed and Em are derived and introduced into the context. They are written as follows. 
(,.11) :t'Rd( M ~et, 7;,~, T~)
Tm represents the time when the e-mail message M exists and L,~ represents the location of M.
The context also includes the following representation when (s4) is interpreted.
(r12) Speaker( John)&llearer(13ill). (r 13) Spa e chTime ( T,p )& 7'e mp F ocus'( Td).
Namely, I assume that the time of deleting~ Td, is in the temporal focus when (s4) is interpreted. Now, let me explain how sentence (s4) is interpreted under the above context. Sentence (s4) describes an eventuality of forwarding, *ell , which is written ~ representation (rl) described in sac. 3.1. Likewise, by using knowledge @2), the following representations are derived. 
(r l 9 ) T [eel( *rel , , *t ], , Td ).
Resolving temporal reference here means determining temporal relationship *tel, in (r19).
By default interi)retation rule (r4), the tbllowing representation is derived from (r19).
(r20) 7'ted(After, *t ] ~ , :l a ).
On the other hand, by applying theorem (r6) to (r19) and then using (r18)and (r]l), the following represent~tion is derived.
(r21) :l'~. ( l,;~o~,y , 7 '~op~ ) . (r2(~) 'Cypd*e,.~ , Z,:a:i.~t) a~ ~ aimox ( .l~,.2~O,,,,~,.( .l~..~, ,p~,,~o,, ) Here, I assume that (s5) directly describes the existentiM status of an individual *obj.e, which is realized as the zero-pronomlnalized subject in the sentence, mid that the existential status is construed as a stat, ive eventuality. '['he location, *l,,2, of *obj.e is specilied as a mail box that the hearer owns since the location is designated hy "sochira no mail 1oox (your mail box)".
The time, *t.,.~, when *obj.e exists is before the speech time since the past-.tense morpheme "ta" is used.
'['he referent for *obj.2 is mnbiguous since the refer cnt can be either e-mail message M or its copy Copy. The relewmt reDrent muss he Copy. As argued below, resolving this nominM reibrence is crucial in resolving temporal reference.
I assume that the time of forwarding, 7}, is in the temporal focus. Resolving temporal reference here means dete.rmining temporal relationship *tel2 t)e~ tween *t,2 and ~/}. The relevant interpretation is th{~t • t~.~ is after illt.
Let me explain how the fi'amework interprets (sS).
First of all, *person in (r26) is identified with Bill, since *person nmst be the hearer. ' ['hen *%2 in (r26) is identitied with E~ovy in (r23). Likewise, *obj.e, *l,~u, and *t~.u are identified respectively with Copy, L~ovy, and Teovv. Thus tim zero-pronominalized subject is appropriately interpreted. As a result, the following temporal relationship is derived from (r26) since *t:,,p. is identified with "l'~ovy and 7} is in the temporal focus. 0,27) 7 'Ied (*,'d~, :I'~o,,,~, '.l) ).
llere, consider how the temporal relationship *tel2 is determined. By using default interpretation rule (rS), *rel.e is identilied with a relatkm, Contains, since the eventuality described by(s5) is stative.
On the other hand, by using (r25) and theorem (rT), *rel.e is identified with a relation, After. In other words, the time of the eventuality deseribe.d by (sS) follows the time of forwarding. This knowledgebased interpretation is l)referred over the default in--terpretation, and is the relevant interpretation.
In the above process, identifying the pronominalized subject, *obj2, of (sS) with Copy is crucial for the temporal reference resolution. Assume that *obj~ is identified with the e-mail message M. This case happens when *ex2 in (r26) is identified with E,~ in (rl0) and *t~2 is identified with 7~. In this case, the following temporal relationship is derived from (r26).
(r28)T~el(.rel~, Tin, T~).
By using (r24) and theorem (r8), *rel2 is identified with a relation, Contains. This interpretation is not relevant.
However, the case that leads to the wrong interpretation never occurs. When *e~2 is identified with Era, the following representation is derived from (r26) since *person is identified with Bill. This representation is inconsistent with (rl0) since the owner of the location of the e-mail message M must be uniquely identified. Thus, *e~.2 must be identified with E~opy and then *obj2 must be identified with Copy.
Consequently, identifying appropriately the referent of the pronominalized subject of sentence (s5) affects the process of resolving temporal reference, and this reference interaction can be explained by exploiting knowledge such as (r2) and (r3).
CONCLUSION
This paper has made a twofold contribution to research on temporal reference resolution. First, an account of the role played by the reference interaction in resolving temporal reference is given. As stated in see. 2, existing models cannot account for how the process of resolving nominal reference affects the process of resolving temporal reference since they do not explain the reference interaction. Second, it is shown that exploiting the reference interaction clarifies how a restricted set of world knowledge (knowledge of the temporal relationships between eventualities and the existential status of individuals) contributes to the resolution process. As stated in see. 2, existing models resort to the entire set of causality knowledge. I do not entirely deny the validity of the existing approach. However, when a restricted set of world knowledge is sufficient to resolve temporal reference, immediate recourse to the entire set of world knowledge of causality can be avoided. A framework is also presented, within which temporal reference is resolved by exploiting the reference interaction.
Future work will first extend the framework to deal with eventualities specified by various tense morphemes, whereas this paper focuses on eventualities specified by the past-tense morpheme "ta". Next, to explore the notion of reference interaction in more detail, the way resolving temporal reference affects the resolution of nominal reference must be investigated, whereas this paper concentrates on the converse process. Finally, the coverage of this framework must be evaluated. Evaluation will require an exhaustive listing of possible cases of the existential status of individuals that are used to resolve reference. This paper accounts for cases where an individual exists at a certain space-time location of the physical world. We can allow for other kinds of existential status, such as a status where an individuM exists in the mental state of a dialogue participant. 11
